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I. INTRODUCTION
A void exists in the laws of Nebraska with respect to guidance for
what constitutes sufficient hardship in granting a zoning variance.
This void was clearly demonstrated in Rousseau v. Zoning Board of
Appeals of Omaha.1 An examination of this lack of guidance in light
of the policy of deference to zoning boards that has dominated variance decisions is necessary to understand why there has been so little
guidance up to the present. The Nebraska Supreme Court has alluded
to the reasons for such deference, stating that “[r]eview overbroad in
scope would have the effect of substituting the judgment of a judge or
jury for that of the [zoning board], thereby nullifying the benefits of
legislative delegation to a specialized body.”2 Despite this policy of
deference, a balance must be reached for deciding whether sufficient
hardship does exist, as too much deference to the zoning boards can
lead to detrimental consequences.3
In Rousseau, the Nebraska Court of Appeals upheld variances for a
front yard setback, a side yard setback, and a reduction in parking
spaces around a proposed residential building, ruling that there was
no abuse of discretion or error of law where the district court upheld
the zoning board’s decision granting the variances.4 Elena Kerwin,
the party seeking the zoning variance in Rousseau, sought to construct a building on a narrow lot in a residential neighborhood in
Omaha, Nebraska, and variances were required for her to be able to
build as she desired.5 The court of appeals looked to the established
rules on variances that stemmed from previous Nebraska Supreme
Court cases, and as there was no violation of any of those rules, the
granting of the variances was affirmed.6
Regarding hardship for zoning variances, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has articulated only three rules in its decisions.7 In Part II, this
Note will examine the history of the Nebraska Supreme Court decisions concerning hardship, laying the foundation for the rules that
have thus far guided the issuing of zoning variances. The lack of guidance created by these existing rules is demonstrated in Rousseau,
which provides an example of how the court of appeals is essentially
limited to deferring to the decision of the zoning board. Part III analyzes how a policy of deference potentially impacts zoning and how, in
order to give sufficient guidance to zoning boards and limit the potential for adverse consequences that can arise from too much deference,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

17 Neb. App. 469, 764 N.W.2d 130 (2009).
Bowman v. City of York, 240 Neb. 201, 210, 482 N.W.2d 537, 544 (1992).
See infra section III.A.
Rousseau, 17 Neb. App. at 479, 764 N.W.2d at 137.
Id. at 470, 764 N.W.2d at 131–32.
Id. at 477–79, 764 N.W.2d at 136–37.
See infra section II.A.
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a new standard should be adopted that will preserve the flexibility
necessary for zoning boards to function as intended.
Rousseau, along with the past decisions of the Nebraska Supreme
Court, shows that current tests are insufficient for zoning boards of
appeals to determine whether sufficient hardship exists to grant a variance. Thus, the deferential approach on appeal of decisions granting
variances can easily lead to problems of corruption and violation of the
spirit of the zoning ordinances. This Note therefore suggests a new
test for zoning boards with respect to determining hardship for granting variances—a test that will follow from the previous decisions set
forth by the Nebraska Supreme Court and protect the interests of individuals, neighborhoods, and communities.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

A History of Hardship
1.

Frank v. Russell

In Nebraska, the foundation for what constitutes sufficient hardship to issue a variance was laid in Frank v. Russell.8 In Frank, a
couple planned to construct a residential building on a corner lot they
had purchased in Scottsbluff, Nebraska.9 After discovery of a city ordinance that did not allow construction at the desired distances from
the property lines, however, the city engineer halted preparation for
construction.10 The couple appealed to the board of adjustment for
the city of Scottsbluff, and after a hearing, the board approved the
original plans.11 The neighbors of the couple appealed the decision to
the district court.12
In district court, the appellants argued that a provision in the city
ordinance that required that the setback of the building be equal to or
greater than the average of the other residences on the block was controlling.13 In response, the couple argued that a provision pertaining
to corner lots controlled, which would have allowed them to build even
closer to the property line.14 Instead of deciding which provision con8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

160 Neb. 354, 70 N.W.2d 306 (1955).
Id. at 355, 70 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 355, 70 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 355–56, 70 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 356, 70 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. at 357, 70 N.W.2d at 309 (noting that the average of the block was forty feet,
and the couple intended to build at twenty-seven feet).
14. Id. at 357–58, 70 N.W.2d at 309 (as near as twenty feet). In large part, the clash
arose because the couple’s building would be constructed on a corner. This
caused tension because the front would not face the same direction as the appellants’ residence—instead it would face the intersecting street—creating a situation where both provisions were potentially applicable, but conflicting. Id. at
356–58, 70 N.W.2d at 309.
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trolled, the district court granted a variance for the construction of the
building with a twenty-seven foot setback, based upon a different provision of the ordinance which allowed “minor variations” where there
were “practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships.”15 The district
court also denied an injunction to prevent construction of the building,16 and the two cases were appealed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court.
The state supreme court reversed, finding the decision to grant a
variance “unreasonable and arbitrary.”17 The court further stated
that allowing the variance would create a thirteen foot encroachment,
which was not a minor variation, that it was “destructive . . . of the
spirit of the ordinance” in violating the uniformity of the other residences, that it obliterated the “symmetry of the block front,” and that
it disrupted the view of the other residences on the block.18 The Nebraska Supreme Court did recognize there would be hardship to the
couple in denying them the opportunity to build as they had planned
and requiring them to tear down what they had started to build.19
The court focused specifically, however, on the fact that the couple had
created their own hardship with knowledge of what the ordinance prohibited, stating: “It would certainly be unreasonable to allow one to
create his own hardship and difficulty and take advantage of it to the
prejudice of innocent parties.”20 The court also seemed to lay down a
rule to govern the granting of variances:
It appears that the rule respecting the right of a board of adjustment, such
as the one here, to grant a variance from zoning regulations on the ground of
unnecessary hardship is generally that it may not be granted: Unless the denial would constitute an unnecessary and unjust invasion of the right of property; if the grant relates to a condition or situation special and peculiar to the
applicant; if it relates only to a financial situation or hardship to the applicant; if the hardship is based on a condition created by the applicant; if the
hardship was intentionally created by the owner; if the variation would be in
derogation of the spirit, intent, purpose, or general plan of the zoning ordinance; if the variation would affect adversely or injure or result in injustice to
others; or ordinarily if the applicant purchased his premises after enactment
of the ordinance.21

Ultimately, the court decided that the provision requiring a forty foot
setback applied.22
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

359, 70 N.W.2d at 310.
355, 70 N.W.2d at 308.
361, 70 N.W.2d at 311.
360–61, 70 N.W.2d at 310–11.
361, 70 N.W.2d at 311.
361, 70 N.W.2d at 311.
362–63, 70 N.W.2d at 312.
366, 70 N.W.2d at 313.
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Eastroads, L.L.C. v. Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals

In Eastroads, L.L.C. v. Omaha Zoning Board of Appeals,23 the Nebraska Supreme Court clarified the rule on granting variances laid
down in Frank. In Eastroads, a company requested an area variance
to an ordinance.24 The zoning board of appeals granted the variance
due to the odd shape of the parcel of land, a rubble fill in the middle of
the parcel that prevented building on that spot, and a state-owned
right-of-way, all of which created practical difficulties to development.25 After an appeal and remand,26 the board of appeals again
granted a variance, pointing out that the building would still meet the
normal requirements of the ordinance for building setbacks.27 The
district court again affirmed the board’s decision, finding that the
granting of the variance “was not illegal, arbitrary, or capricious,”28
based on the rubble fill, the state right-of-way, and the irregular shape
of the property.29 On appeal, following the decision in Frank, the
court of appeals found that the granting of the variance was illegal, as
the difficulties were self-created in knowingly purchasing property
with the rubble fill that created practical difficulties.30
The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, pointed out that the Court
of Appeals did not consider the right-of-way created by the state after
the purchase of the property,31 and this “significant factor”32 was not
self-created. The court used this to distinguish the case from Frank,
where the only difficulty was in having to tear down the building that
was placed on the land in violation of the ordinance.33 The court also
pointed out that the court of appeals incorrectly relied upon the “rule”
in Frank,34 which stated that a variance would not ordinarily be
granted “if the applicant purchased his premises after enactment of
the ordinance.”35 The court characterized this “rule” as merely dicta,
and thus the fact that the land was purchased after the restrictions
were in place would not prevent the granting of a variance, although it
could be taken into consideration by the board in its decision.36
23. 261 Neb. 969, 628 N.W.2d 677 (2001).
24. Id. at 970–71, 628 N.W.2d at 679 (noting that the ordinance required a thirty foot
buffer of landscaped vegetation between the lots and the residential lots
adjacent).
25. Id. at 971, 628 N.W.2d at 679.
26. Id. at 972, 628 N.W.2d at 680.
27. Id. at 972–73, 628 N.W.2d at 680.
28. Id. at 973, 628 N.W.2d at 680–81.
29. Id. at 973–74, 628 N.W.2d at 681.
30. Id. at 977, 628 N.W.2d at 683.
31. Id. at 977, 628 N.W.2d at 683.
32. Id. at 978, 628 N.W.2d at 684.
33. Id. at 978, 628 N.W.2d at 684.
34. Id. at 978, 628 N.W.2d at 684.
35. Frank v. Russell, 160 Neb. 354, 363, 70 N.W.2d 306, 312 (1955).
36. Eastroads, 261 Neb. at 978–79, 628 N.W.2d at 684.
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Therefore, following the standard of review for district courts in reviewing board of appeals’ decisions, the court found that there was no
abuse of discretion or error of law made by the district court, and it
accordingly reversed the decision by the court of appeals.37 The Frank
rule had consequently been clarified in that hardship created by the
party is not sufficient hardship to issue a variance.
3.

Alumni Control Board v. City of Lincoln

Shortly after the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Frank, the
court further shaped Nebraska zoning law by proclaiming another
rule regarding the issuance of variances. In Alumni Control Board v.
City of Lincoln,38 a fraternity requested a variance that would allow it
to construct a larger building than was allowed by the city zoning code
and the school’s housing code and that would allow it to vary off-street
parking requirements.39 The requested variance was denied by the
building inspector and on subsequent appeals by the zoning board of
appeals, the city council, and the district court.40 The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the denial.41 The court pointed out that the requirements imposed by the code were reasonable, granting the
variances would “be in derogation of the spirit and intent and general
plan of the zoning ordinance,” and that there was opposition to the
variance at the hearing by the owners of some of the adjacent property.42 Ultimately, the court concluded that the “mere fact that the
plaintiff would like to have a fraternity house of larger dimensions
does not establish practical difficulty in complying with the
ordinance.”4344
4.

Bowman v. City of York

The Nebraska Supreme Court added its latest rule regarding the
hardship necessary to grant a variance in Bowman v. City of York.45
In Bowman, a company applied for a variance that would allow it to
build the rear wall of a warehouse within one foot of the property line
that divided its property from the residential property of the Bow37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 979, 628 N.W.2d at 684.
179 Neb. 194, 137 N.W.2d 800 (1965).
Id. at 194, 137 N.W.2d at 801.
Id. at 194, 137 N.W.2d at 801.
Id. at 200, 137 N.W.2d at 804.
Id. at 198, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
Id. at 198, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
The requested variance for parking was also denied, as at 1280 feet from the
property it would be greater than the maximum distance of 1200 feet allowed by
the code, and thus denying the variance would not be seen as unreasonable or
arbitrary. Id. at 199, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
45. 240 Neb. 201, 482 N.W.2d 537 (1992).
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mans, whereas the zoning code required a fifteen foot setback.46 The
city board of adjustment granted the variance, and the Bowmans appealed.4748 The district court reversed the granting of the variance,49
and an appeal was made to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The state supreme court articulated the rules that would govern
the scope of review, both for the district court’s review of the board’s
decision and for the appellate court’s review of the district court’s decision.50 The court recognized the high degree of deference that has
governed review of the granting of variances, stating:
[Local zoning boards] provide a high level of expertise and an opportunity for
specialization unavailable in the judicial or legislative branches. They are
able to use these skills, along with the policy mandate and discretion entrusted to them by the legislature, to make rules and enforce them in fashioning solutions to very complex problems. Thus, their decisions are not to be
taken lightly or minimized by the judiciary. Review overbroad in scope would
have the effect of substituting the judgment of a judge or jury for that of the
agency, thereby nullifying the benefits of legislative delegation to a specialized body.51

With respect to such deference, the court announced the scope of review for a district court reviewing a board of appeals’ decision granting a variance, stating that “a district court may disturb a decision of
such a board only if . . . the decision was illegal or is not supported by
the evidence and is thus arbitrary, unreasonable, or clearly wrong.”52
Following this, the court also determined the scope of review for appellate reviews of district court decisions, declaring that “the appellate
court is to decide if, in reviewing a decision of a board of adjustment,
the district court abused its discretion or made an error of law.”53
In determining the legality of the variance, the court applied the
relevant statute governing the issuance of variances in cities and villages: section 19-910 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska.54 The court
46. Id. at 203–04, 482 N.W.2d at 540.
47. Id. at 206, 482 N.W.2d at 541.
48. While on appeal, the company, York Cold Storage, began constructing the warehouse notwithstanding the appeal, as they felt it would increase their profits. Id.
at 206–07, 482 N.W.2d at 541–42. However, the court determined that this reliance was not in good faith, as the company knew a week before commencing construction that the order was being appealed, and thus this reliance would not
prevent an adverse ruling. Id. at 216, 482 N.W.2d at 547.
49. Id. at 203, 482 N.W.2d at 540.
50. Id. at 210–11, 482 N.W.2d at 542–43.
51. Id. at 210, 482 N.W.2d at 544 (quoting Bentley v. Chastain, 249 S.E.2d 38, 40
(Ga. 1978)).
52. Id. at 210–11, 482 N.W.2d at 544 (citing Mossman v. City of Columbus, 234 Neb.
78, 449 N.W.2d 214 (1989); Frank v. Russell, 160 Neb. 354, 70 N.W.2d 306
(1955)).
53. Id. at 211, 482 N.W.2d at 544.
54. The statute provides, in relevant part, that boards can grant variances only if
strict application “would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to
or exceptional and undue hardships upon the owner.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-
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found that the application of the code would not produce undue hardship.55 The court also held that the company’s sole stated hardship,
wanting to increase profits, did not constitute sufficient hardship to
justify granting a variance, stating that “it does not provide a basis for
riding roughshod over the rights of others by obtaining a variance
from zoning regulations with which the rest of the community must
live.”56
From the preceding cases three rules have been laid down by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in relation to what constitutes sufficient
hardship for the granting of a variance. First, there is not sufficient
hardship when the party seeking the variance created their own hardship.57 Second, wanting to build a larger building does not alone constitute sufficient hardship.58 Finally, wanting to increase profits does
not alone constitute sufficient hardship.59 These rules laid the foundation for the state of the law leading into Rousseau.
B.

Rousseau v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Omaha
1.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2005, Elena Kerwin purchased a vacant lot in Dundee, an area
located within Omaha, Nebraska.60 Kerwin made plans to build a
four-story, four-unit condominium in a “federal” style similar to buildings found in cities such as Chicago and New York.61 After working
with a city planner and redesigning the plans several times in attempts to conform to the city zoning code, Kerwin decided a variance
would be required in order for her construct the building in the desired fashion.62 Kerwin thus appealed to the zoning board, seeking
variances for the front yard setback, the side yard setback, and the offstreet parking requirement.63 The front yard setback variance would
change from thirty-five feet to twenty feet; the side yard setback variance from twelve feet to ten feet; and the parking variance from one
and one-half stalls per unit in the building to one stall per unit, in
total, from six to four stalls.64 The board granted the three requested

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

910(1)(c) (Reissue 1987). Undue hardship, in turn, is defined as “demonstrable
and exceptional hardship as distinguished from variations for purposes of convenience, profit or caprice.” Id. § 19-910(2)(d).
Bowman, 240 Neb. at 213, 482 N.W.2d at 545.
Id. at 213, 482 N.W.2d at 545.
See supra subsections II.A.1–2.
See supra subsection II.A.3.
See supra subsection II.A.4.
Rousseau v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 17 Neb. App. 469, 470, 764 N.W.2d 130, 131
(2009).
Id. at 470, 764 N.W.2d at 131–32.
Id. at 470, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 470, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 470–71, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
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variances.65 The appellant, Mark Rousseau, who owned the property
adjacent to Kerwin’s lot, then filed a complaint in the district court
seeking a reversal of the granted variances.66 After a trial, the district court found that no variance was actually required for the front
yard setback,67 following a zoning code section that allowed an exception to the thirty-five foot setback by taking the mean setback of all
the buildings on the block face.68 The court then upheld the zoning
board’s granting of the variances with regard to the side yard setback
and the parking requirement, finding that the density of the neighborhood created a hardship justifying the variances.69
2.

Court of Appeals Opinion

The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Beginning with the front yard setback, the court recognized that
the district court applied the wrong exception from the Omaha zoning
code, having used the exception that would apply if there were no adjacent buildings within one hundred feet on either side of the building
to be built.70 As there were buildings on both sides, the correct exception instead took the average setback of the two adjacent buildings,
and that average would apply as the minimum front setback.71 Although the court did not have precise measurements, the evidence indicated that the setbacks of the two adjacent buildings were very near
fifteen feet and twenty-five feet.72 At an average of twenty feet—the
same distance as the proposed setback of Kerwin’s building—the court
found that either no variance was required or, if other measurements
admitted into evidence were used, a minimal variance of less than two
inches would be required.73 The decision pertaining to the front yard
setback was affirmed.74
The more significant issue in the case was whether the hardship
justified the granting of variances for the side yard setback and the
off-street parking requirement. At trial in front of the district court,
Kerwin had provided testimony from the former Omaha planning director, Robert Peters, who testified that the Dundee area was developed to be a high-density neighborhood for worker housing around the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 471, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 471, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 471–72, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 474, 764 N.W.2d at 134 (noting that the district court applied OMAHA, NEB.,
MUN. CODE, ch. 55, art. XVI, § 55-782(c)(3) (1980), which, as pointed out by the
Nebraska Court of Appeals, was the incorrect subsection to apply).
Id. at 472, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
Id. at 474, 764 N.W.2d at 134.
Id. at 473, 764 N.W.2d at 134.
Id. at 474–75, 764 N.W.2d at 134.
Id. at 475, 764 N.W.2d at 134.
Id. at 479, 764 N.W.2d at 137.
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turn of the twentieth century. He testified further that the modern
zoning regulations were drafted to control growth in suburban areas,75 providing for larger front and side yards. Because the district
court had accepted this characterization of the issue as one of density,
the appellate court deferred to that characterization.76 The Nebraska
Court of Appeals dismissed arguments made by Rousseau that the
hardship had to be equivalent to a taking,77 that no hardship existed
if the land was purchased after the ordinance was enacted,78 and that
there was no hardship if Rousseau’s own property value would be impaired.79 In so doing, the court addressed the question of whether the
hardship caused by the “density of an already existing, land-poor development conflict[ing] with a strict application of area requirements”
was sufficient to justify the granting of the variance.80 The appellate
court pointed out the only three “hard and fast rules”81 that have been
set down in Nebraska cases. As this situation was not affected by
those rules, the court was required to pay homage to the deference
granted to the zoning board of appeals.82 Thus, the granting of the
variances was affirmed, because there was no abuse of discretion or
error of law in the district court’s decision.83
C.

Statutory Guidance

In Nebraska, there are four different statutes that govern the issuing of variances, corresponding to the different communities where
the variance is sought.84 Variances in cities of the first85 and second86
class and in villages87 are governed by section 19-910 of the Revised
Statutes of Nebraska. Under this statute, the board of adjustment has
75. Id. at 476, 764 N.W.2d at 135.
76. Id. at 476, 764 N.W.2d at 135.
77. Id. at 477, 764 N.W.2d at 136 (citing several Nebraska Supreme Court cases that
approved variances when the hardship did not constitute a taking).
78. Id. at 477–78, 764 N.W.2d at 136 (following the holding of Eastroads, where the
variance would only be improper if the party requesting the variance created
their own hardship).
79. Id. at 478, 764 N.W.2d at 136 (noting that where the district court did not accord
weight to Rousseau’s testimony that the variance would impair his property
value, the Nebraska Court of Appeals would not substitute its own findings).
80. Id. at 478, 764 N.W.2d at 136.
81. Id. at 478, 764 N.W.2d at 137; see supra section II.A.
82. Rousseau, 17 Neb. App. at 478–79, 764 N.W.2d at 137.
83. Id. at 479, 764 N.W.2d at 137.
84. Thomas Sattler, Comment, Variances and Parcel Rezoning: Relief from Restrictive Zoning in Nebraska, 60 NEB. L. REV. 81, 89–96 (1981).
85. Cities of the first class are those having more than 5000 but not more than
100,000 inhabitants. NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-101 (Reissue 2007).
86. Generally, cities of the second class are those with more than 800 but not more
than 5000 inhabitants. Id. § 17-101.
87. Generally, villages have not less than 100 and not more than 800 inhabitants.
Id. § 17-201.
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the power to grant a variance when strict application of the ordinance
“would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties . . . or
exceptional and undue hardships.”88 Such variances would be authorized by the board of adjustment only if it finds that:
(a) The strict application of the zoning regulation would produce undue hardship; (b) such hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the same
zoning district and the same vicinity; (c) the authorization of such variance
will not be of substantial detriment to adjacent property and the character of
the district will not be changed by the granting of the variance; and (d) the
granting of such variance is based upon reason of demonstrable and exceptional hardship as distinguished from variations for purposes of convenience,
profit, or caprice.89

In counties the controlling statute for issuing variances is section
23-168.03 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. The requirements of
this statute are the same as those for cities of the first and second
class and for villages, in that the board of adjustment has the power to
grant a variance when strict application of the ordinance “would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties . . . or exceptional
and undue hardships.”90
Variances in cities of the primary class91 are governed under section 15-1106 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. Following this statute, the boards of zoning appeals may grant variances “to the extent
necessary to permit the owner a reasonable use of his or her land in
those specific instances when there are peculiar, exceptional, and unusual circumstances in connection with a specific parcel of land, which
circumstances are not generally found within the locality or neighborhood concerned.”92 Whether the circumstances fall within the “peculiar, exceptional, and unusual circumstances” provided for in the
statute seems to be left to the discretion of the board of zoning
appeals.93

88. Id. § 19-910(1)(c). Section 19-910(1)(c) authorizes the granting of variances:
when by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of a
specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the zoning regulations, or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of
property, the strict application of any enacted regulation . . . would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional
and undue hardships upon the owner of such property.
Id.
89. Id. § 19-910(2).
90. Id. § 23-168.03(c); see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
91. Cities of the primary class are those with more than 100,000 but not more than
300,000 inhabitants. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-101 (Reissue 2007).
92. Id. § 15-1106.
93. Sattler, supra note 84, at 91.
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Variances in cities of the metropolitan class,94 such as Omaha in
Rousseau, are governed by section 14-411 of the Revised Statutes of
Nebraska. By this standard, the board of appeals may grant a variance when “there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in
the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinance.”95 Although the statute itself contains no specific guidance as to what
would constitute “unnecessary hardships,” one commentator96 argues
that the Supreme Court of Nebraska did set out the relevant considerations in Peterson v. Vasak.97 In Peterson, the court stated that such
hardship occurs when:
the use restriction, viewing the property in the setting of its environment, is
so unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary and capricious interference with
the basic right of private property; or that there is convincing proof that it is
impossible to use the property for a conforming purpose; or that there are
factors sufficient to constitute such a hardship that would in effect deprive the
owner of his property without compensation. An unnecessary hardship exists
when all the relevant factors taken together convince that the plight of the
location concerned is unique in that it cannot be put to a conforming use because of the limitations imposed upon the property by reason of its classification in a specific zone.98

Despite this purported “definition” of hardship, Nebraska courts have
not explicitly followed the considerations set out in Peterson, and so,
as of the deciding of Rousseau, there was no judicial definition as to
what constituted sufficient hardship in the granting of a variance.
III. ANALYSIS
Variances, which are basically exemptions for a specific piece of
property from the limitations required by zoning ordinances, are normally granted when strict adherence to the limitations of the ordinance would result in “unnecessary hardship” to the owner.99 They
“provide flexibility in a zoning ordinance . . . [by allowing] a board of
zoning appeals [to] permit a use, or simply an intensity of use, that is
impermissible under the current zone.”100 In other words, as pointed
out by the Nebraska Supreme Court, the purpose of a variance is to
allow “the amelioration of the rigors of necessarily general regulations
94. Metropolitan class cities have 300,000 or more inhabitants. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 14-101 (Reissue 2007).
95. Id. § 14-411.
96. Sattler, supra note 84, at 96.
97. 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956).
98. Id. at 508, 76 N.W.2d at 426 (citing 58 AM. JUR. Zoning § 203 (1948); C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions for Variations in Application of Zoning Regulations and Special Exceptions Thereto, 168 A.L.R. 13
(1947)).
99. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1396 (1961).
100. Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 918 (2007).
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by eliminating the necessity of a slavish adherence to the precise letter of the limitations where in a given case little or no good on the one
side and undue hardship on the other would result from a literal enforcement” as well as “to prevent the ordinance against attack on the
ground of unreasonable interference with private rights.”101 From
this it can be seen that the goal of granting a variance is to strike a
balance between the public good—which is purportedly advanced by
the passing and application of a zoning ordinance “so that the spirit of
the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured,
and substantial justice done”102—and private rights, which allow the
owner to determine how their own land is to be utilized.
A.

Deference

As can be observed from the Nebraska cases, deference to the local
zoning board is a very significant consideration in judicial review of
the granting of variances.103 This deference allows for the zoning
boards to use their more intimate knowledge and familiarity with the
community to make decisions in the best interest of the individuals, as
well as other members of the community, more effectively than a removed judicial body. Courts are typically conscious of the fact that
local zoning boards are in a better position to make such decisions,
and consequently courts are normally hesitant to “substitut[e] their
judgment for that of a community’s elected representatives.”104 However, too much deference to local zoning boards creates problems that
can outweigh the benefits obtained by taking advantage of local
knowledge and expertise.
101. Peterson, 162 Neb. at 508, 76 N.W.2d at 426–27 (citing Lee v. Bd. of Adjustment,
37 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1946); C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions for Variations of Zoning Regulations and Special Exceptions
Thereto, 168 A.L.R. 13 (1947)).
102. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (Reissue 2007).
103. See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text; supra note 83 and accompanying
text. See generally Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use
Decisions: Lessons From RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 727–37 (2008)
(discussing historical and modern judicial deference in relation to zoning); 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 62:35 (4th ed. 2009) (noting a presumption of validity in favor of the zoning
board of appeals).
104. Ostrow, supra note 103, at 731; see also Burnham v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n,
455 A.2d 339, 341 (Conn. 1983) (“We have said on many occasions that courts
cannot substitute their judgment for the wide and liberal discretion vested in
local zoning authorities when they have acted within their prescribed legislative
powers.”); Leslie v. City of Toledo, 423 N.E.2d 123, 125 (Ohio 1981) (“No appellate
court, under the guise of judicial review, should nullify the zoning code, which
has been written and adopted by the members of a city council, the duly-elected
representatives of the people.”).
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When so much deference is given to the local zoning board—overturning their decision, for example, only when “the decision was illegal or is not supported by the evidence and is thus arbitrary,
unreasonable, or clearly wrong,”105—there is insufficient guidance to
prevent the board from potentially taking advantage of this power.
This in turn can have a tendency to add to “the highly discretionary,
inconsistent, and often corrupt system of land use regulation that
prevails throughout the country.”106 The relatively small size of the
zoning board lends itself to being especially susceptible to corruption
or domination by a few individuals who disproportionately can affect
zoning.107 Added to this problem is the fact that local zoning officials
often lack training or zoning planning experience,108 and thus they
should not reasonably be expected to consistently make decisions that
are in the best interest of the community. From the foregoing
problems, it can be seen that a policy of deference in all facets of zoning, but particularly with regard to variances,109 can lead to problems
that will often outweigh any benefit that is received from that
deference.
B.

Developing the New Standard

In order to combat the problems potentially raised by a policy of
deference in granting variances, a more concrete, objective standard
should be followed.110 As one commentator put it, in providing gui105. Bowman v. City of York, 240 Neb. 201, 210–11, 482 N.W.2d 537, 544 (1992).
106. Ostrow, supra note 103, at 725–26 (citations omitted).
107. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 855 (1983) (“[S]heer corruption, made
possible in smaller representative bodies because a limited number of persons
have influence which must be bought. Another possibility is domination by a few
who are perceived by others as the powerful. The decisions of these few can affect
many within the community . . . . Finally . . . the factional domination created by
a popular ‘passion’—sometimes a sudden whim, sometimes a longstanding
prejudice—that carries a majority before it.”) (citations omitted).
108. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 308 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005) (“[Zoning officials] range from citizen volunteers
with no training or expertise in administration or land use, to persons chosen
more for their political connections than for their expertise or wisdom, to professionals.”); Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and the
Mediation of Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435, 440 (2006)
(noting that zoning officials “are not planning or technical experts”).
109. BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING INVITATIONS
TO ABUSE DISCRETION § 2:3 (Patrick Fong ed., 12th ed. 2009) (“Perhaps no other
zoning flexibility technique has received as much criticism as the variance.”).
110. Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1155,
1162 (1985) (arguing that plans, which are “notoriously vague[,] . . . provide no
genuine standards for individual [zoning] decisions”); see also Ostrow, supra note
103, at 737 (“Judicial deference to this process—in which decisions are made in
the absence of procedural safeguards, by untrained zoning officials, on a subjective and highly discretionary basis—cannot be considered reasonable.”).
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dance with respect to decisions on variances, “the optimum standard
should be one sufficiently tough so that the fabric of local zoning remains intact, yet realistic and fair enough so that zoning boards do not
have to ignore the law to reach equitable variance decisions.”111
These considerations are equally important to variances in Nebraska;
any review should similarly have the goal of being stringent enough to
honor the goals of the local zoning ordinances, yet flexible enough to
allow variances in the interest of fairness and equity.
In Nebraska, the zoning boards themselves are given guidance by
the relevant statutes based upon the size of the community,112 as well
as by locally adopted ordinances. These statutes, however, fail to define sufficient hardship in granting variances. The district courts, in
their review of the zoning boards’ decisions concerning the granting of
variances, are limited by the standard of review to disturbing those
decisions only when “the decision was illegal or is not supported by the
evidence and is thus arbitrary, unreasonable, or clearly wrong.”113
From the rulings of the Nebraska Supreme Court—where hardship
does not exist only when the party seeking the variance created their
own hardship,114 wanted only to build a larger building,115 or wanted
only to produce increased profits116—it can be seen that deference to
the zoning boards would cause the majority of variance decisions to be
affirmed by the courts on appeal, especially if the party seeking the
variance is able to articulate a reason other than those denounced by
the Nebraska Supreme Court. This is due to the fact that the rules
regarding hardship are, in a sense, “negative.” That is, they articulate
certain rules about what “sufficient hardship” is not, but do not give
guidance as to what “sufficient hardship” is. These “negative” rules
are thus inadequate to achieve the goals previously expressed in honoring the spirit, intent, purpose, and general plan of the zoning
ordinance.
To come up with a hardship standard that is sufficient to protect
the interests of the zoning ordinance and not allow deference to control to the detriment of the greater good, certain considerations must
be taken into account to give guidance as to what hardship is, not just
what it is not. The Nebraska Supreme Court attempted to articulate
what it felt constituted sufficient hardship in relation to section 14411,117 but that definition has not been followed. Looking outside of
111. Ann Martindale, Replacing the Hardship Doctrine: A Workable, Equitable Test
for Zoning Variances, 20 CONN. L. REV. 669, 713 (1988).
112. See supra section II.C.
113. Bowman v. City of York, 240 Neb. 201, 210–11, 482 N.W.2d 537, 544 (1992).
114. See supra subsections II.A.1–2.
115. See supra subsection II.A.3.
116. See supra subsection II.A.4.
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (Reissue 2007); see supra note 98 and accompanying
text. The majority of states have differentiated between use variances and area
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Nebraska, the case that is most often cited118 for defining the elements of hardship, Otto v. Steinhilber,119 stated that to have hardship
necessary to grant a variance, a court must find:
(1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a
purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which
may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that
the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character
of the locality.120

The application of this hardship test, whose elements the majority of
states have adopted and in some cases have expanded upon,121 has
been criticized as being too strict, as it only allows for variances when
“strict compliance with the zoning result[s] in no reasonable use that
could be made of the property,” and the variance is thus “used as a
constitutional safety valve to avoid what might otherwise be unlawful
takings.”122 Accordingly, in looking to formulate a new test that gives
sufficient flexibility to allow fairness and equity for the landowner—
although wanting to be stricter than the almost complete deference in
use now—it is more advantageous for the overall balance of interests
not to be as strict as the test of Otto.
One commentator has argued that, after first making sure that the
hardship is significant, three requirements must be taken into account in considering hardship for zoning variances, including (1) “the
hardship is related to the property” and not the personal circumstances of the person seeking the variance; (2) the hardship is unique
to the petitioner (since if it affected more people in the area, an
amendment to the ordinance would be proper instead of an individual
variance); and (3) the question of whether the hardship was created by
the petitioner should be considered as a factor in determining whether

118.
119.
120.

121.
122.

variances, often with different requirements between the two necessary to suffice
for hardship—typically the showing of hardship for a use variance is more stringent than for an area variance. However, eighteen states, including Nebraska, do
not distinguish between use variances and area variances legislatively or judicially. 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 13:8 (5th ed. 2009).
BLAESSER, supra note 109, at 169.
24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939).
Id. at 853 (citation omitted). This test has subsequently been codified in New
York. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-b(3)(b)(i)–(iv) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 267-b(2)(b) (McKinney 2004); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b) (McKinney
1996).
BLAESSER, supra note 109, § 2:12.
David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for
Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L., 279, 288–89 (2004)
(citations omitted). Despite this stringent definition of unnecessary hardship, at
least nineteen states use a similarly stringent definition, including Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. 3 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING §§ 20.09, 20.16, 20.17 (4th ed. 1996).
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a variance is warranted.123 This proposed test coincides fairly well
with the previous Nebraska decisions. For example, that the hardship
is related to the property, not the personal circumstances of the petitioner, is a broader requirement that would encompass the rule from
Bowman—that wanting to increase profits of the petitioner is not sufficient to constitute hardship.124 The proposed test, however, also differs somewhat from the previous Nebraska Supreme Court decision in
Eastroads, which held that a petitioner cannot create their own hardship,125 whereas the proposed test would only take that factor into
consideration.126 Thus, in order to follow the precedent already laid
down by the court, a new guideline would still disqualify those who
create their own hardships from receiving a variance.127
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, also dissatisfied with the
stringent test it had previously followed, adopted a new test in Simplex Technologies, Inc., v. Town of Newington.128 The newly adopted
test allowed for the granting of a variance due to hardship when:
(1) a zoning restriction as applied to their property interferes with their reasonable use of the property, considering the unique setting of the property in
its environment; (2) no fair and substantial relationship exists between the
general purposes of the zoning ordinance and the specific restriction on the
property; and (3) the variance would not injure the public or private rights of
others.”129

The test of Simplex Technologies focuses more on how the proposed
variance will affect the neighborhood and community around the landowner than simply on the petitioner himself. This characteristic
makes the test particularly attractive when attempting to maintain
the desired balance between the public good and the private rights of
the landowner. Although the New Hampshire test does not coincide
exactly with the three rules the Supreme Court of Nebraska has
adopted, it complements those rules by requiring the zoning board to
look beyond the petitioner and their own hardship to see how the suggested variance would affect the others of the community.
From examining the foregoing discussion, it follows that a new test
for “hardship” should be adopted that would take into account the
goals of the variance—striking a balance between the public good and
the private rights of the individual to not be overly burdened by the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Owens, supra note 122, at 318–19.
See supra subsection II.A.4.
See supra subsection II.A.2.
Owens, supra note 122, at 319.
For a collection of cases also disqualifying those who create their own hardships,
see Richard Gutekunst, The Self-Inflicted Hardship Rule in Pennsylvania Variance Law, 27 VILL. L. REV. 156 (1982), and Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The SelfInduced Hardship in Zoning Variances: Does a Purchaser Have No One But Himself to Blame?, 20 URB. LAW. 1 (1988).
128. 766 A.2d 713 (N.H. 2001).
129. Id. at 717.
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necessarily general zoning ordinance—as well as the deference that
has always been important to the courts130 and the previous rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
C.

Proposed New Standard

Taking the foregoing considerations into account, a new standard
governing “hardship” for zoning variances in Nebraska can be proposed. To begin with, in looking to the petitioner, the stated hardship
must be unique to that petitioner, since if it affected a larger group of
people, an amendment to the zoning ordinance would be more appropriate than continuously granting variances.131 Also, the stated hardship should be related to the property and not to the personal
circumstances of the party seeking the variance, since the “variance
runs with the land rather than being a personal right, so such a limitation is warranted.”132 As this requirement would cover one of the
rules adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court (i.e., that wanting to
increase profits does not constitute sufficient hardship), the only other
rules for the individual originating with the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Nebraska are that wanting to build a bigger building does not
alone constitute sufficient hardship, and the individual cannot create
their own hardship. These rules would be necessarily incorporated
into the new standard.
The new standard will also look for guidance to the rules adopted
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Simplex Technologies in
order to ensure that the best interests of the neighborhood and community at large are specifically taken into consideration. Thus, the
final three considerations of the new standard are that the zoning restriction interferes with the party’s reasonable use of the property in
considering the unique setting of the property in the surrounding
area, that no fair and substantial relationship exists between the general purposes of the zoning ordinance and the specific restriction on
the property in question, and that the proposed variance would not
injure the rights of others.
Pulling all of this together, the proposed new standard can be articulated as the following: (1) the stated hardship must be unique to
the petitioner; (2) the hardship must be related to the property and
not to the personal circumstances of the petitioner; (3) a desire to construct a larger building alone does not constitute a sufficient hardship;
(4) the petitioner cannot create their own hardship; (5) the petitioner’s
130. See supra section III.A.
131. For a collection and analysis of cases requiring uniqueness to the petitioner, see
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The “Unique Circumstances” Rule in Zoning Variances—An Aid in Achieving Greater Prudence and Less Leniency, 31 URB. LAW.
127 (1999).
132. Owens, supra note 122, at 318.
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reasonable use of the property, considering the unique setting of the
property in the surrounding area, must be the subject of interference;
(6) no fair and substantial relationship may exist between the general
purposes of the zoning ordinance and the specific restriction on the
property; and (7) the proposed variance may not injure the rights of
others.
This proposed hardship standard is superior to the previous policy
of extreme deference to zoning boards in that it provides more specific
rules to guide the board in its decision, requiring it to make certain
findings considering the effects on the individual seeking the variance
and on the community surrounding the property at issue. However,
the standard is also broad enough to allow the board the flexibility to
deal with necessarily general zoning ordinances that could otherwise
unfairly restrict some individual landowners. The new standard for
hardship could thus be applied to the relevant statutes that guide the
issuing of variances. Following such a standard would allow reviewing courts to continue to defer to boards as they have in the past,133
allowing for the benefits of such a policy, such as local expertise, while
avoiding the detriments that have given variances a bad name.134
D.

Application to Rousseau

Although one can only speculate as to what the zoning board of
appeals in Rousseau would have found when considering the factors of
the proposed new standard, a brief application would help illustrate
how the new standard would apply in such a situation.
The hardship was unique to petitioner Kerwin’s property, as she
was attempting to build upon an empty lot, whereas the surrounding
lots all had existing buildings which were not affected by the zoning
ordinance.135 Similarly, the hardship was also related to the property
and not the personal circumstances of Kerwin.136 This was shown
through testimony that pointed out how the Dundee area was developed into small lots for high density housing, but the current zoning
was drafted to control suburban growth.137 Practically any building
that was proposed to be built on the lot would face similar hardship.
Although the next two considerations—that wanting to build a bigger
building alone is not sufficient for hardship and that a petitioner cannot create their own hardship—could possibly be argued against Kerwin (particularly because it was her intended design that led to the
violation, which calls into question whether she created her own hard133. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
134. See supra section III.A.
135. Rousseau v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 17 Neb. App. 469, 470, 764 N.W.2d 130, 131
(2009).
136. Id. at 472, 764 N.W.2d at 132.
137. Id. at 476, 764 N.W.2d at 135.
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ship), the Court of Appeals in Rousseau specifically pointed out these
two pre-existing rules, and yet it still allowed the variance,138 once
again following a policy of deference.139
Whether the zoning restriction interfered with Kerwin’s reasonable use of the property was not addressed, although one could easily
see how she would argue that it did; she wanted to build what she saw
as an aesthetically pleasing building. The party opposing the variance
could argue that there were other reasonable uses the lot could have
been put to, and thus her reasonable use was not the subject of interference. This would be a good example of where the local expertise of
the zoning board would come into play, allowing the board to hear the
arguments and decide what really was reasonable.
According to expert testimony received, no substantial relationship
existed any longer between the purposes of the zoning ordinance and
the restriction on the property.140 This consideration overlaps in this
case with the relationship of the hardship to the property—that the
land at one point was zoned for high density, small lots, but the ordinance in the present is designed more for controlling suburban development. Finally, whether the variance would injure the rights of
others was only briefly mentioned in the opinion, where, although the
neighbor said the proposed building would impair his property value,
the trial court did not give any weight to that argument.141 One can
only speculate whether the board, following the proposed new standard, would have given more weight to his testimony. This goes to
show how the proposed standard would give more guidance to the zoning boards in granting variances, and thus the courts would not have
to worry that granting deference to the boards would have a detrimental impact on neighborhoods and communities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion traces how the Nebraska Supreme Court
has slowly developed rules pertaining to sufficient hardship for the
granting of a variance. Despite the policy of deference that has directed the decisions in this area, more guidance is needed to protect
against the dangers of unfettered deference to zoning boards. This
Note looked at how adopting a new standard with more strict guidelines can protect against those dangers, while still allowing for sufficient flexibility in zoning variances to ensure the rights of the
landowner when faced with the necessarily general zoning ordinance.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Land use planning is an integral aspect of organized society, particularly when it comes to people interacting not only with land, but
with others around them in their neighborhoods and communities. In
order to foster good relations between individuals and their communities, while still providing for the efficient use of land and protecting
the rights of landowners to seek to use their property as they wish, a
fair balance must be sought. By giving more guidance to zoning
boards in issuing variances, that balance can more readily be attained
in this area of land use planning, thus granting more protection to
property owners and community members.
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